| CVE ID | CVE-2026-26927 |
| Publication date | 02 April 2026 |
| Vendor | Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa |
| Product | Szafir SDK Web |
| Vulnerable versions | All before 0.0.17.4 |
| Vulnerability type (CWE) | Use of Less Trusted Source (CWE-348) |
| Report source | Report to CERT Polska |
| CVE ID | CVE-2026-26928 |
| Publication date | 02 April 2026 |
| Vendor | Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa |
| Product | SzafirHost |
| Vulnerable versions | All before 1.1.0 |
| Vulnerability type (CWE) | Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value (CWE-354) |
| Report source | Report to CERT Polska |
Description
CERT Polska has received a report about vulnerabilities in Szafir software and participated in coordination of their disclosure.
The vulnerability CVE-2026-26927: Szafir SDK Web is a browser plug-in that can run SzafirHost application which download the necessary files when launched.
In Szafir SDK Web it is possible to change the URL (HTTP Origin) of the application call location. An unauthenticated attacker can craft a website that is able to launch SzafirHost application with arbitrary arguments via Szafir SDK Web browser addon. No validation will be performed to check whether the address specified in document_base_url parameter is in any way related to the actual address of the calling web application. The URL address specified in document_base_url parameter is then shown in the application confirmation prompt. When a victim confirms the execution of the application, it will be called in the context of attacker's website URL and might download additional files and libraries from that website. When victim accepts the application execution for the URL showed in the confirmation prompt with the "remember" option before, the prompt won't be shown and the application will be called in the context of URL provided by the attacker without any interaction.
This issue was fixed in version 0.0.17.4.
The vulnerability CVE-2026-26928: SzafirHost downloads necessary files in the context of the initiating web page. When called, SzafirHost updates its dynamic library. JAR files are correctly verified based on a list of trusted file hashes, and if a file was not on that list, it was checked to see if it had been digitally signed by the vendor. The application doesn't verify hash or vendor's digital signature of uploaded DLL, SO, JNILIB or DYLIB file. The attacker can provide malicious file which will be saved in users /temp folder and executed by the application.
This issue was fixed in version 1.1.0.
Credits
We thank Michał Leszczyński for the responsible vulnerability report.
More about the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process at CERT Polska can be found at https://cert.pl/en/cvd/.